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Abstract
Of the 20 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases that the United States Supreme
Court has decided in the 25 years of the statute’s existence, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring is
without doubt the most significant for people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities. Olmstead is the only Supreme Court ADA case that specifically addresses the
rights of people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, but its importance goes
well beyond this specific fact. In this essay, I set out the holding of the Olmstead decision, its
connection to, and extension of, prior case law, the extent of its subsequent enforcement,
and its implications in areas that go beyond the institutional context of the case itself.
Key Words: American with Disabilities Act; intellectual and developmental disabilities; Olmstead Act;
community-based services; inclusion
Of the 20 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
cases that the United States Supreme Court has
decided in the 25 years of the statute’s existence,
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring (1999) is without
doubt the most significant for people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities. Olmstead is the only Supreme Court ADA case that
specifically addresses the rights of people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities, but its
importance goes well beyond this specific fact.
The Olmstead case is noteworthy for its broad
recognition of the rights of people institutionalized in congregate facilities to live and receive
needed services and supports in the community.
Critically, Olmstead endorsed the congressional
finding in the ADA that institutionalization
constituted discrimination (Americans with Disabilities Act, §12101(a)(3), 2012). At least since the
beginning of the Obama Administration, aggressive Executive Branch enforcement, coupled with
private litigation, has resulted in a sea change with
regard to the perceptions of people with cognitive
disabilities and their right to live and thrive in the
community. Further, Olmstead is one of those rare
cases that is important not only in its own right,
and for its specific holding, but also for the
16

possibilities it offers for reform in other areas of
importance in the lives of people with cognitive
disabilities. In this article, I set out the holding of
the Olmstead decision, its connection to, and
extension of, prior case law, the extent of its
subsequent enforcement, and its implications in
areas that go beyond the institutional context of
the case itself.

The Olmstead Decision
Olmstead concerned two individuals, known in the
case report as L.C. and E.W., who were people
with intellectual and mental health disabilities.
Both women were in and out of institutional
settings in Georgia and filed suit claiming that
their confinement in a segregated environment
violated their constitutional right to due process
and statutory right to nondiscrimination under
Title II of the ADA, which covers public (state and
local) services (Jamieson, 2015).
Olmstead was not the first case to argue that
individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities had a right to receive services in
community-based settings. The case built on
landmark right-to-treatment and right-to-habilitaThe Olmstead Imperative
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tion cases, such as Wyatt v. Stickney (Partlow in
Alabama; 1972), NYSARC v. Carey (Willowbrook
in Staten Island, New York; 1975), and others, and
lower federal court cases such as Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hospital (Pennhurst,
outside Philadelphia; 1977) and Evans v. Washington (Forest Haven, outside Washington, D.C.;
1978). These cases, in the late 1970s and early
1980s, recognized the viability and necessity of
community-based care for people with disabilities.
The constitutional effect of these cases, however,
had stalled after the Supreme Court’s 1982
decision in Youngberg v. Romeo; and though
community-based programs continued to expand
as an alternative to institutions, they did so
without significant judicial imprimatur.
Fast forward to the passage of the ADA in
1990. As early as 1995, a federal appellate court
had concluded that public entities were required
to administer services to people with disabilities in
the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs (Helen L. v. Didario, 1995). Later that year,
the initial Olmstead complaint was filed in federal
court. In Olmstead, the lower courts did not
address the constitutional question presented,
nor did the Supreme Court. Rather, the Court,
citing the ‘‘integration regulation’’ issued under
Title II of the ADA, concluded that Title II of the
ADA banned unnecessary institutionalization as a
form of discrimination on the basis of disability.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court’s 6–3
majority, noted:
Recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of
discrimination reflects two evident judgments.
First, institutional placement of persons who
can handle and benefit from community
settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions
that persons so isolated are incapable or
unworthy of participating in community life.
. . . Second, confinement in an institution
severely diminished the everyday life activities
of individuals, including family relations,
social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement,
and cultural enrichment. . . . Dissimilar
treatment correspondingly exists in this key
respect: In order to receive needed medical
services, persons with mental disabilities must,
because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life that they could
enjoy given reasonable accommodations,
R. D. Dinerstein
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while persons without mental disabilities can
receive the medical services they need without
similar sacrifice. (Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. at
600-01, 1999; citations omitted)
Despite the Court’s understanding of the harms
of institutionalization, its embrace of the statutory imperative of community-based care was
narrower than that of the opinions of the lower
courts. The majority did not want to force
individuals into community-based settings that
they did not seek, nor did it support community
placement if professionals did not recommend it.
Further, it was concerned that a system of
community placements not amount to a fundamental alteration of the state’s program for
service delivery, which would constitute a defense
to the claim of discrimination. Accordingly, the
Court held that
under Title II of the ADA, States are required
to provide community-based treatment for
persons with mental disabilities when the
State’s treatment professionals determined
that such placement is appropriate, the
affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably
accommodated, taking into account the
resources available to the State and the needs
of others with mental disabilities. (Olmstead v.
L.C., 527 U.S. at 607, 1999)
It is worth focusing on the three elements of the
Olmstead holding, not only for what the Court
wrote, but for what concerns lay behind these
elements. The first requirement, that the State’s
professionals determine that community-based
treatment is appropriate, is a tacit reference to
the 1982 Youngberg decision, which held that states
did not violate the due process rights of institutionalized persons if their professionals exercised
professional judgment in their practices and
recommendations (Youngberg v. Romeo, 1982).
In the years leading up to the Youngberg
case, there was far from a consensus among
professionals working with people with intellectual and developmental disabilities that all
individuals, including people with severe and
profound intellectual impairments, could be
served in community-based settings (Wyatt v.
Ireland, 1979). But between the late 1970s and
1999, when Olmstead was decided, almost all
professional disagreement about the appropri17
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ateness of community-based treatment for all
people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities had vanished, so that this first
element seemed to be stating a truism rather
than marking out controversial territory. The
Court was careful in Olmstead not to require
community placement when professionals
deemed it inappropriate, and seemed to recognize a continued role for institutions that many
would not support. But as events have played
out, the stance of professionals on community
placement has not been an impediment to
community integration.
The second element—that the affected persons
not oppose treatment—provided a basis for
recognizing the value of individual choice, while
leaving as an unacknowledged open question what
a state must do if an individual under guardianship does not oppose community placement but
his or her guardian does. Because the Court
viewed community placement conceptually as a
reasonable accommodation, it quoted language
from the Title II regulations providing that people
cannot be forced to accept a reasonable accommodation in support of the proposition that
community placement could not be required over
a person’s objection.
The most controversial element, arguably, was
the third one. The state of Georgia had asserted
that inadequate funding and not discrimination
was the reason for plaintiffs’ continued institutional confinement. The lower courts and Supreme Court rejected this argument, but the latter
showed greater sympathy for demands on the state
resources, while holding the following:
Unjustified isolation . . . is properly regarded
as discrimination based on disability[,] . . . We
recognize, as well, the States’ need to maintain
a range of facilities for the care and treatment
of persons with diverse mental disabilities,
and the States’ obligation to administer
services with an even hand. . . . In evaluating
a State’s fundamental alteration defense, the
District Court must consider, in view of the
resources available to the State, not only the
cost of providing community-based care to
the litigants, but also the range of services the
State provides others with mental disabilities,
and the State’s obligation to mete out those
services equitably. (Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S.
at 597, 1999)
18
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The Court elaborated on this last sentence by
observing that:
If, for example, the State were to demonstrate
that it had a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons
with mental disabilities in less restrictive
settings, and a waiting list that moved at a
reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s
endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard
would be met. (Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. at
605-06, 1999)
Commentators and advocates were concerned
that this interpretation of the fundamental alteration
defense could serve as a brake on deinstitutionalization efforts. That fear has not come to pass. Instead,
Olmstead has come to stand for a ringing endorsement of community integration of people with
mental disabilities in multiple aspects of daily life.

Beyond the Individual Case
It is tempting to look at the Olmstead decision
from the perspective of the present and conclude
that its extraordinary influence was foreordained.
But the plenary implementation of Olmstead was
far from guaranteed. For one thing, almost from
the beginning, commentators, advocates, and
policy makers treated Olmstead as if it were in fact
a class action rather than a case on behalf of two
individuals. (Questioning from the Justices at oral
argument reflected this approach, as well.)
The Clinton Administration immediately
jumped on the decision as support for its policies.
Little more than a month after the decision,
Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna
Shalala made a speech to the National Conference
of State Legislators in which she extolled the
decision and stated that it furthered the Administration’s ultimate goal, of ‘‘a nation that integrates
people with disabilities into the social mainstream,
promotes equality of opportunity, and maximizes
individual choice’’ (The Center for An Accessible
Society, undated). She followed that speech on
January 14, 2000, with a letter to all 50 state
governors, and a letter from the Health Care
Financing Administration to all 50 state Medicaid
directors, outlining a framework for implementing
Olmstead. (Freedom Clearinghouse, undated).
After the change in administrations, on June 18,
2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive
The Olmstead Imperative
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Order No. 13217, ‘‘Community-Based Alternatives
for Individuals with Disabilities,’’ which called on
the federal government to assist states to implement
Olmstead, adding: ‘‘The United States is committed
to community-based alternatives for individuals
with disabilities and recognizes that such services
advance the best interests of the United States’’
(Disability World, 2001). The Executive Branch’s
embrace of Olmstead was critical in making sure that
the decision stood for more than providing
community-based services to two individuals.
As the years went on, some disability advocates
saw the Bush Administration’s commitment to
Olmstead enforcement as far from vigorous (National Disability Rights Network, 2009; Judge David L.
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, 2009). But
with the advent of the Obama Administration in
2009, Olmstead enforcement took off. The Obama
Administration announced that 2009 would be
named ‘‘The Year of Community Living’’ (Department of Justice, 2015). Under the leadership of Civil
Rights Division officials, including its Special
Counsel for Olmstead Enforcement, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has brought statewide investigations leading to letters of findings and consent
decrees on behalf of people with developmental or
psychiatric disabilities institutionalized in Delaware,
Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Puerto Rico, and Virginia (Department of Justice,
2015). These investigations have extended Olmstead
beyond individual state institutions to include all of
a state’s institutions, an enforcement approach as
sweeping as federal efforts to address statewide
violations of civil rights in the historical realms of
education and voting rights. Moreover, the kinds of
institutions include not only traditional psychiatric
institutions and institutions for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, but also
nursing homes and adult care homes.
Olmstead enforcement is not just the province
of the Executive Branch. ‘‘The majority of
litigation to enforce Olmstead has been brought
by legal aid agencies, public interest law firms, and
the nationwide network of Protection and Advocacy Systems (P&As)’’ (National Disability Rights
Network, 2015, p. 9). Moreover, in the Obama
Administration, DOJ has frequently issued a
Statement of Interest and then sought intervention
in private lawsuits bringing Olmstead challenges,
reflecting a public-private partnership that has
often proved fruitful in large-scale civil rights cases
that are highly resource- and personnel-intensive.
R. D. Dinerstein
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Beyond Institutions
As extensive as statewide enforcement of Olmstead
rights in institutional settings is, perhaps the most
noteworthy recent development in implementation of the decision is its extension to settings that
go beyond residential institutions and community-based residences. One prominent extension has
been to sheltered workshops, where both private
plaintiffs and the Justice Department have pursued litigation to eliminate this segregated form of
work for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities (Lane v. Kitzhaber, 2012; United
States v. State of Rhode Island, 2014). In 2015, the
DOJ sent a letter of findings to officials in Georgia
alleging that the state’s administration of the
Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic
Support (GNETS) violated Title II of the ADA by
unnecessarily segregating schoolchildren with behavior-related disabilities away from their nondisabled peers (Department of Justice, 2015).
Although not yet reflected in case law or
executive enforcement, there are other areas in
which Olmstead may spur development of more
integrated approaches to activities of daily life.
Professor Leslie Salzman has argued that Olmstead
should be used to challenge states’ use of guardianship for people with disabilities as an unnecessarily
segregated and restrictive form of decision making
for them (Salzman, 2010). Indeed, the increasingly
rapid development of supported decision making as
a less restrictive alternative to guardianship presents
interesting possibilities for using Olmstead in support
of what may be the most important component of
an adult’s life: the right to make choices (Blanck &
Martinis, 2015; Dinerstein, 2011–2012). Voting is
another frontier in which the Olmstead focus on
community integration could be used to support
reasonable modifications in the voting process—
modifications that enable people with intellectual
and developmental disabilities to participate in the
political process as other citizens do.

Conclusion
American society has come a long way from a
district court case brought on behalf of two
individual women with intellectual and mental
health disabilities in Georgia who wanted to
receive the supports they needed in the community, rather than in a regional psychiatric hospital.
Through forceful and creative advocacy by
individuals, advocates, lawyers, and governmental
19
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officials, Olmstead has come to stand for a true
community imperative. Work in this area is not
finished, by any means. As we celebrate this 25th
anniversary of the ADA, it is important to
recognize this crowning achievement of equality,
nondiscrimination, and integration.
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